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Summary findings
Using a household budget survey for 1992, Hassan-  the number of rates and brackets increased from 7 to  10,
shows the poor revenue performance and distribuLional  and the levels of exemption remain unchanged.
impact of BuLgaria's  personal income tax system. He  (Complex, higher rates complicate administration and
explores the implications for revenue and income  enforcement and provide inicentives  for tax evasion. And
distribution of two alternative tax systens  - a flat.  tax  in the alternative systems Hassan explores, the poor are
and a progressive but simpler three-brackets tax system.  protected with higher exemnptions.)
He demonstrates that simpler tax structures with lower  Fortunately, the country's personal income tax
tax rates could achieve at least equal revenue and  structure began to move toward less nominal
distributional objectives and are superior in terms of  progressivity after Bulgaria's 1997 tax reform program.
efficiency anid equity. (The findings are robust when  The tax rate in the top income bracket was reduced from
Bulgaria's significant tax evasion is included.)  52 percent to 40 percent, the number of tax brackets was
But tax changes since 1992 have, if anything, moved  halved, and the exemption level was increased 20
Bulgaria even further  from a simple income tax system:  percent (reducing tax burdens on the poor).
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1. Introduction
Almost all emerging market economies (EMEs) are contemplating fundamental
reforms of their tax systems.  These reforms are determined by country-specific combination
of factors including the advice of external experts and international agencies (Tanzi,  1991,
World Bank,  1988 and Harberger,  1993), acute pressures from  expenditure and revenue sides
of the budget (Bogetic and Hillman,  1994), the increasing complexity of the administrative
task (Bird, 1989 and Tanzi,  1992), and the internal political economy of public finance
reforms  (Bogetic and Hillman,  1995).
Political economy factors, however, often clash with the recommendation of experts
who emphasize simplicity and transparency in the tax systems.  As a result, although tax
reforms may start with good intentions and well-defined objectives of the reformers, the
outcome is often different from what it was envisaged at the outset.  For example, Shome and
Escolano (1993), in their survey of tax policy in the Former Soviet Union countries show that
despite substantial effort on tax policy reform, the tax systems are often becoming more, not
less complicated and transparent.  Also, the Bulgarian authorities initiated far-reaching tax
reforms with the objective of creating a tax system consistent with a market economy (Chand
and Lorie  1993); these include the replacement of the old turnover tax system by a modem,
single-rate value added tax, and the reduction of the corporate income tax rates.  But in other
areas, notably personal income taxation, the tax reform has not resulted in a simpler tax
structure which is compatible with the more demanding administrative task and powerful
incentives for evasion that characterize EMEs.  The amendment to the 1992 Personal IncomeFareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  2
Tax Law enacted in March 1993 resulted in a substantial increase in tax rates and the number
of tax brackets.
In late 1997 Bulgaria adopted major tax reform measures to be effective in 1998.
These measures include: (i) reducing marginal tax rates on both personal and corporate
incomes to 40 percent; (ii) aligning the top marginal personal tax rate with the corporate tax
rate to diminish the incentive to shift income among the categories of personal income,
partnership income, and corporate income; (iii) reducing tax burdens on the poor by raising
the exemption level by 20 percent; and (vi) flattening personal income tax rate schedules as the
number of tax brackets has been halved.  However, the new personal income tax structure tax
resulting from the 1997 amendment to the 1993 Personal Income Tax Law resembles, to a
greater extent, the 1992 tax system'.
Given the 1992, 1993, and 1997 reform episodes, the similarity of the 1997 personal
income tax schedule to the 1992 structure, and the availability of a detailed household budget
survey for 1992,  this paper attempts to examine the revenue adequacy and equity effects of
Bulgaria's tax reform experience.  In particular, the paper seeks to analyze the following two
issues, which should be of broader interest in Bulgaria, and in other EMEs.  First,  it examines
the effects of the 1992 personal income tax system on revenue and post-tax income
distribution.  Second, it explores if an alternative, simpler tax structure with lower tax rates
could achieve at least equal revenue and distributional objectives as the 1992 system, and
demonstrates tfhat  a system with lower rates is superior in terms of revenues and distributional
effects.
To answer the second, counterfactual  question, which is of particular interest for tax
policy, I examine the effects of simplifying the existing personal income tax system in three
interrelated areas: (i) reducing the number of tax brackets, (ii) lowering tax rates, and (iii)
1/The 1997 system exemplifies  a progressive  5-tax bracket structure  (including  the lowest-tax  free
bracket) with five rates of zero, 20, 26, 30, andc40  percent. This pattern of tax rates is similar to the
1992  system given in Table 1 below.Tax Reform in Transition  3
raising the income threshold at which a positive tax payment must be made.  In each case the
objective is to obtain better or at least revenues equal to those that would be obtained under the
1992 system.  Furthermore,  the distributional consequences of the proposed tax reform are
examined, taking into account the existing income distribution as reflected in the 1992
household budget survey.
The type of analysis and principles enunciated are potentially of wider interest to other
EMEs for two reasons.  First, the striking similarities in the pattern of income distribution in
these economies recently reported by Milanovic (1995) and Hassan and Peters (1996).
Second, a comparison of the income tax systems in these economies - as shown in section 2 -
reveals that these systems suffer from similar deficiencies as Bulgaria's  system, notably, low
exemption level for the poor,  large number of tax brackets, and high rates.  So the analysis is
potentially capable of providing useful direction for improving the design of personal income
tax not only in Bulgaria, but also in other Eastern European countries contemplating tax
reform.
The remainder of the paper comprises three sections.  Section 2 reviews the 1992
personal income tax structure and potential and actual revenue performance, utilizing the 1992
income distribution data.  This section also compares Bulgaria' s personal income tax system
with those in other economies, notably transitional economies.  Section 3 presents and
discusses the counterfactual analysis of alternative tax structures with equal or better revenue
raising potential and re-distributional impact.  The analysis also takes into account the existing
high tax evasion level.  Conclusions and thoughts on broader implications of the analysis for
tax reform in other EMEs are given in the final section.
2. The Need For Revenue
The evolution of Bulgaria's tax revenues and fiscal balance relative to GDP since 1991
are shown in Table 1.  The table shows that the country experienced a decline of tax
revenue/GDP  -- from nearly 38 percent of GDP in 1991 to 28 percent of GDP in 1996, and isFareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  4
estimated  to remain at that level in 1997. With the large contraction  of output shown in Table
1, the decline  of revenue in real terms was even larger than suggested  by falling ratios to
GDP.  Revenue  losses from taxes on corporate income  accounted  for the larger share of the
decline  of revenue. Profits tax revenue, once the key source of government  revenue, has
become  far less important,  falling from 17.3 percent of GDP in 1991 to 2.2 percent in 1993,
before recovering  to 4.5 percent in 1996. These, together  with social security  contributions,
were the main sources of government  revenues  under the command  economy.  Table 1 also
shows  that the relative importance  of personal income  tax is increasing,  particularly  when
compared  with the dwindling  revenue performance  of profits tax associatecl  with the erosion of
the corporate income  tax base (Bogetic  and Hillman, 1994). Indeed, the revenue productivity
of personal income tax has not only been rising  but has even surpassed  profits tax revenue
performance  since 1993.
Thoujgh  the personal income  tax has increased  in relative importance  as a source of
revenue, its contribution  to GDP is still lagging  behind  market economies  and several  Eastern
European  countries. For instance  in most OECD  countries, income taxes, excluding  social
security  contribution,  amount  to between 10 and 15 percent of GDP (McLure 1990). Also, in
Romania, a country at a similar stage in the transition  process, the share of personal income
tax revenue in GDP was 8 percent in 1992 (Shome,  Haindl, and Schenone,  1993). This
indicates  that the revenue potential  of this tax instrument  is yet to be fully exploited  in
Bulgaria.
The overall high tax burden (nearly  30 percent of GDP) is not surprising, given the
prevalence  of state participation  in many economic  activities  and provision  by state of many
services  (e.g., social security  expenditures  accounted  for nearly 10 percent of GDP in 1996).
Despite  the relatively  high tax burden, the fiscal deficit was large, ranging from 6 to 13
percent of GDP during 1991-1996.  Thus the need for revenue reflects the level of
government  expenditure.Tax Reform in Transition  5
Table 1: Tax Revenue and Fiscal Deficit, 1991-1997
(in percent of GDP)
Tax  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Est.
1997
Income tax  3.8  5.4  5.0  4.4  4.2  4.7  4.7
Profits tax  17.3  6.8  2.2  3.7  3.8  4.5  4.5
Social security  7.8  10.7  10.1  8.9  8.0  7.3  7.3
contributions
Excises and customs  4.8  4.6  6.8  6.2  5.2  3.7  3.7
Turnover/  VAT  3.8  3.6  3.5  7.3  6.8  7.0  7.0
Other taxes  0.0  2.0  1.3  1.3  1.7  1.0  1.0
Totaltaxrevenue  37.5  33.1  28.9  31.7  29.7  27.9  27.9
Fiscal Deficit  8.2  7.2  10.9  6.4  5.7  13.4  4.4
memo. item
GDP growth  -11.7  -7.3  -1.5  1.8  2.1  -10.9  -7.4
Source: Hassan and Bogetic (1996); World Bank (1997).
Before discussing the revenue potential, it is necessary to outline the actual tax structure
and the associated actual revenue performance.  The 1992 personal income tax exemplified a
steeply graduated tax-rate schedule (see Table 2).  There were seven tax brackets including the
lowest tax-free bracket.  The exemption level for the poor was low, comprising individuals
earning up to 9,000 Lev, or about 50 percent of average household per capita income as
reported in the 1992 household budget survey (nearly 88 percent of the minimum annual
wage).  There was a progressive scale, with marginal tax rates ranging from 20 percent to a
maximum of 40 percent at annual income over 240,000 Lev.Fareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  6
What is the potential revenue that this income tax structure could generate?  To
calculate the potential revenue, it is important to know not only the aggregate tax base --
individual incomes -- but also its distribution.
Table 2:  Bulgaria's Personal Income Tax Schedule, 1992
Annual incorne (Lev)  Annual tax schedule
0- 9,000  tax free
9,000 - 12,000  20 % on excess over 9,000
12000.01- 36,000  600+  24 % on excess over  12,000
36,000.01  - 72,000  6,360+  28 % on excess over
36,000
72,000.01-120,000  16,440  + 32 % on excess over
72,000
120,000.01-240,000  31,800  + 36 % on excess over
120,000
over 240,000  75,000  + 40 % on excess over
240,000
Source:  Tax Notes International  Vol. 6, No. 19, 1993,  p.  1140.
Bulgarian households' income level and distribution for 1992 was derived from the
1992 Individual Budgets of Households Survey compiled by the National Statistical Institute
(NSI) of Bulgaria. 2 The sample covered 2202 households. It was constructed as a two-tier
random sample based on a sample frame developed from the 1985 Population Census.  The
data allow a preliminary examination of the questions I am interested in: (i) how well the tax
brackets and rates capture the revenue potential of their respective income groups, and (ii) how
well they serve any distributional objectives implicit in the existing tax structure?  To this end,
the section briefly discusses the relationship between the distribution of income and the
2/A more detailed  study of the country's income  distribution, including  details of the survey and a
discussion  of its representativeness,  is given by Hassan and Peters (1996).Tax Reform in Transition  7
statutory tax brackets in the 1992 income tax structure.  Specifically, potential revenue is
defined for each tax bracket as follows:
PPITRj =  X-  (Xij tj + ajx),  (1)
where:
PPITR, = Potential Personal Income Tax Revenue derived from tax bracket j;
Xi  =  ith household gross personal income falling in tax bracket j;
ti  = jth statutory personal income tax rate given in Table 2; and
aji  =  additional Lev payment associated with each tax rate (see Table 2).
In 1992, the poorest 20 percent of the population received only 10.4 percent of the
household per capita income.  The average income in this category was 8,151 Lev, or less than
half the average household per capita income (16,809 Lev).  These levels of income were so
low (the minimum annual wage was 10,200 Lev in 1992, or approximately US$ 443 at the
1992 average exchange rate of 23 Lev per U.S.  dollar) that it was hard to argue, on either
revenue or equity grounds, that a broadly based income taxation should include this income
group in the tax base.  Even if it were practically possible to include this group one would
have to impose very high average rates to get any worthwhile revenues in view of its very
small share of the total income.
The first positive income tax bracket income of the 1992 system was applied to annual
incomes between 9,000 and 12,000 Lev at the rate of 20 percent (see Table 2).  This bracket
covered three quarters of the second income decile, all of the third decile, and 22 percent of
the fourth decile (i.e.,  approximately 20 percent of the total number of potential taxpayers).
But the average income in these three income decile as a share of the average household per
capita income was only 56, 65, and 74 percent, respectively.  These levels of income were
relatively low and potential revenues from personal income tax as a share of total personal
income were therefore small, amounting to 1.2 percent for the second income decile and 3.5Fareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  8
percent for the third one.  This means that the first positive tax bracket was rather narrow in
relation to the income group it covered.
The second positive income tax bracket of 24 percent covered 78 percent of the fourth
income decile, all of the fifth through ninth deciles, and 65 percent of the highest income
group in 1992.  This tax bracket had the broadest base, covering nearly two-thirds of the total
number of households.  Potential revenue as a share of total personal incoime  was in the range
of 4.7 to 16.5 percent, depending on the niumber of households subject to tax in each of the
income decile in question.
The next three tax brackets of the 1992 schedule given in Table 2 covered a small part
of the households.  The 28 percent rate was applicable to only 73 households in the survey or
one third of the top income decile.  Also, tax rates of 32 and 36 percent covered only three
households in the 1992 survey.  These brackets were extremely narrow relative to the tax base
which they were designed to tap.  Perhaps even more striking is the fact that the maximum 40
percent tax rate applied to incomes of over 240, 000 Lev exceeded the maximum income
reported in the 1992 household budget survey, indicating that this tax bracket was applied to a
nonexistent base! Figure  1 shows the misrnatch between the 1992 income distribution and
bracket/rate tax structure.
Total potential personal income tax revenue (TPPITR) can be expressed as follows:
TPPITR =j  Ei (Xij  t1 + aj),  (2)
where:
j  =  1, 2, 3  ... ,  7 (i.e.,  seven tax rates as given in Table 2);
i  =  1, 2, 3 ........  2202 households included in the survey; and Xij tj, and a;j
are as defined in equation 2.
The application of equation 2 to household income as recorded in the 1992 survey yielded
potential revenue amounting to Lev 4.1 million with an average income tax payment of Lev
1850 per capita, or a potential average income tax rate of 8.3 percent.  This amount was
substantially higher than the actual 1992 income tax payment of Lev 1.5 million, giving anPercent  of Income
O  VI::  I  I  I  i
t  8  1Il  X  W I  i 8-  f\  i.  |4 *'  F 
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average payment of only Lev 681, or an effective average income tax rate of 4.06 percent.
Apparently, the 1992 structure of brackets a.nd  tax rates showed a gross mismnatch  with the
underlying income distribution which they were designed to "capture" (see Figure  1).
Next,  I analyzed the structure of effective personal income tax rate (EPITR),  defined as
the percentage of household per capita income actually paid as personal income tax by income
decile.  The survey results showed that low-income households had markedly lower effective
tax rates than higher-income households.  For the lowest income decile, this ratio was as small
as 1.4 percent: of income, whereas the top income class paid more than four times higher rate
(Hassan and Bogetic,  1996).  Furthermore,  the effective tax rates showed a steady rise with
income over aL  range of intermediate income levels (deciles two through six), suggesting a very
progressive  1992 system.
The analysis of potential tax revenue was combined with actual tax revenue to derive an
index of personal income tax non-compliance (IPITNC,),  defined to be the ratio of potential
income tax revenue to actual revenue for each income class:
IPITNC, = PPITR, / EPITR,  (3)
Where s=1,  2, 3.  .......  10, (i.e.,  10 income deciles).
Equation 3, revealed that, on the average, potential income tax revenue was at least
twice as large as the amount actually collected.  Furthermore,  the non-compliance index rises
with the level of income.  For instance, the effective tax rate for the top income class
(EPITRIO)  was only 5.8 percent, while the potential rate (PPITR 1O)  was 17.7 percent,  giving an
index of tax non-compliance (IPITNC 1 O)  of 304 percent for 1992.
Finally, Bulgaria's  statutory tax rates and brackets are rather high by international
standards. For example, Sicat and Virmani (1988) and McLure (1990) present extensive
statistical information on the tax rates and brackets in over sixty developed and developing
countries.  They concluded that the reduction of income tax rates is probably the most
dramatic manifestation of the tax reform wave that swept both developed and developingTax Reform in Transition  11
countries over the past two decades (e.g.,  the top rate has been reduced from 60 to 40 percent,
a relative reduction of one third).  In contrast, Bulgaria has increased its rates with the top rate
rising from 40 percent in 1992 to 52 percent in 1993.  Bulgaria's top rate is the highest from
among the 10 counties presented in McLure's  study, exceeding those of the two notable
outliers -- Sweden and Japan 3. Although the 1997 amendment to Bulgaria's personal income
tax has reduced the top-bracket rate to its 1992 level of 40 percent, several countries have
further reduced, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their income tax rates (notably Colombia
and Indonesia), which makes the contrast even more striking.
However, a comparison of income tax rates in EMEs, reveals that part of the high
income tax rate 'syndrome'  may be a regional peculiarity of these economies.  The following
nine countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Czech Rep.,  Hungary, Poland,  Romania, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, representing a spectrum of EMEs all have extremely high top
marginal tax rates, often higher than Bulgaria's top rate.  Interestingly, the minimum marginal
tax rate is also rather low, between 6 percent in Romania and 15 percent in the Czech
Republic4. This suggests prima faciae that, much like Bulgaria, other transitional economies
may also face design problem in their income tax systems.  This particularly so if the
underlying income distribution in those countries is not adequately taken into account in
designing appropriate tax rates and tax brackets.  Recent analyses of income inequality and
poverty trends in EMEs by Milanovic (1995) and Hassan and Peters (1996), show some
striking similarities in the patterns of poverty and inequality in these economies.  In particular,
the pattern of inequality of income (e.g.,  Gini coefficient) in Bulgaria is found similar to that
in Poland and Romania.  Therefore,  to the extent that the income tax system in Poland and
Romania may suffer from similar deficiencies as Bulgaria's  system, particularly low exemption
3/Countries  included in the study are: Australia, Canada, Columbia, Indonesia, Israel, Japan,  Mexico,
Sweden, UK and USA (Table 15.1, p. 282).
4/There is an acute lack of country studies on the effects of taxes in the course of economic transition.
Some exceptions include studies of Czechoslovak Republic (Coulter et al.  1993), Romania (Shome,
Haindl and Schenone 1993) and former Soviet Republics (Shome and Escolano 1993).Fareed M. A.  Hassan, ECSPE  12
level,  large number of brackets, high rates, and mismatch between incomie  distribution and
bracket/rate tax structure, a similar analysis for these countries may provide useful direction
for improving the design of their income taxes.
3. Towards  Simpler,  Lower  Rate  Stiructure
The previous analysis has shown that the income tax structure is associated with the
significant tax non-compliance (i.e.,  potential revenue is, on the average.,  at least twice the
amount actually collected).  This reflects poor design of tax rates and tax brackets, and the
incentives for tax evasion inherent to the present income tax system.  Incentives for tax
evasion are also amplified by the vastly expanded number of individual taxpayers relative to
the pre-refiorm period.  Given the slowly improving tax administration, considerably larger
number of taxpayers means that the probability of detection of non-compliance is reduced,
making tax evasion less costly.  And if evasion becomes sufficiently endemic, due to a social
conformity  effect, even small changes in tax rates may induce the remaining taxpayers to
switch to the state of evasion causing a large increase in evasion (see Myles and Naylor,
1996).
I therefore explore the possibility of simplifying the tax structure and reducing the
incentives for tax evasion by lowering highest marginal rates, while generating equal or more
revenues from a broad base 5.  This would reduce tax non-compliance and improve the
effectiveness of the income tax as a reveniue raising tool, and as an instrument of
redistribution.  It would also ease the enforcement of such a simpler tax structure.  In this
context,  I constructed several counterfacluals to examine the scope for improving the income
tax structure in three interrelated areas which are implied by the previous analysis: (i)
5/Lower tax rates in a more simple system i:ncrease  compliance and revenue, and a simple tax system
is less of a constraint to economic growth sc that the tax base is widened, both through less evasion
and growth,  leading to greater revenue (see Morrissey, 1995).  More basically,  lower taxes have lower
economic cost,  i.e. excess tax burden, and they are desirable on efficiency grounds.  Furthermore,  if
the tax system can be changed so that the protection for the poor is at least maintained and even
increased, t:hen such a change would satisfy the Rawlsian notion of social justice as well.Tax Reform in Transition  13
reduction in the number of tax brackets broadening their coverage; (ii) reduction in the highest
marginal tax rates; and (iii) consideration of alternative income threshold at which a positive
tax payment must be made.  These changes aim to tap the information on the underlying  1992
level and distribution of income to ensure equal or better revenue as well as protection of poor
than under the 1992 system.  In a nutshell, the counterfactual results show that the 1992
income tax system could be surpassed in its revenue raising and re-distributional effects by a
much simpler tax system.
3.1.  A Low, Flat Rate Tax System with High Exemption Can Raise More Revenue and
Increase Protection of the Poor
Consider a flat rate system with higher exemption level which incorporates better
potential revenue and equity effects.  Given the income levels and distribution provided by the
survey, a very simple tax structure that exempts the poor (lowest 20 percent of the population)
and levies a flat rate of 11 percent on the rest of the population would raise approximately the
same revenue as the 1992 system (see panel a of Table 3).  That is, the flat rate yields a
potential tax revenue per taxpayer of 1,881 Lev, compared to 1,850 Lev under the 1992
system, i.e.,  revenue-neutral reform.  This means that a linear system with a rate that is
approximately half the lowest current statutory rate could generate approximately the same
revenue as the 1992 tax system.  The reason why the surprisingly low flat tax rate is found to
be feasible from the revenue perspective lies in the fact that the underlying income distribution
is not adequately taken into account in designing the 1992 tax rates and tax brackets (see
Figure  1).  An alternative to this low flat rate would be a somewhat higher uniform rate of 20
percent along with the same, higher exemption for the poor.  This linear rate system, which
could be justified  on revenue grounds, has a significantly higher revenue potential of 3036 Lev
per taxpayer,  compared to 1,850 Lev under the 1992 personal income tax schedule (see panel
b of Table 3).Fareed M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  14
3.2.  A More Progressive, Three-Bracket System Can Raise Even More Revenue
The main arguments made in favor of a simple system with fewer tax brackets and flat
rate(s) is simplicity, revenue potential and other potential supply side incentives related to
saving and investment 6. Its biggest disadvantage is the lack of progressiveness.  Besides the
acknowledged need to generate revenue, personal income tax is also often expected to perform
a redistributive function.  The significant excess of the income of the rich above mean income
suggests that -- on the basis of the principle of ability to pay --  it is desirable to collect
substantial tax revenues from the rich 7.  To explore the revenue implications of alternative,
but more progressive  income tax than the previously discussed flat-rate tax., I have constructed
an alternative tax structures with broad, yet realistic, tax brackets derived from the 1992
income distribution.  Panel c of Table 3 shows an altemative system with four brackets
(including the lowest tax-free bracket,  as in the flat-rate system) and four marginal rates of
zero, 20 percent,  30 percent,  and 40 percent. This system has the potential to raise an average
6/The analysis  does not attempt  to assess longer-term  effects  of tax policy through changes  in the level
of capital formation  and growth. Lower flat rates have the obvious  advantage  of reducing  disincentives
to a wide range of economic  activities, includiing  work effort and saving and investment.  Nevertheless,
it is difficult  to quantify these effects  although  there is often no question  about  their direction. For
instance, Marsden's (1986) study uses evidence  from 20 countries, spanning  almost  the entire spectrum
of world economies,  to show that those with lower taxes experienced  faster economic  growth and
higher employment  and productivity. Hall and Rabushka  (1985)  estimate  the potential  gains from their
proposed simple flat wage and business  tax as a 6 percent increase in output  from increased  total work
in the US economy  and an additional  increment  to total output of 3 percent from added capital
formation, p. 75.  Eissa (1995, 1996)  analyzed  the labor supply response  to the US Tax Reform Act of
1986.  She found that while  married women  at the top of the income  distribution increased  their labor
supply  by 18 percent, male responsiveness  was very little.  For a comprehensive  survey of the
economic  effects of the tax reform Act of 1986  on the US economy,  see Auerbach  and Slemrod  (1997).
7/ Stern (1987) shows  that greater inequality  in income-earning  ability did indeed result in higher
optimal  tax rates.  On the other hand, Brennan  and Buchanan  (1980)  and Harberger  (1993) argue that
the design of tax policy should be guided  primarily  by practical considerations  such as simplicity,
uniformity and transparency  as opposed  to the rates implied  by the optimal  tax theory. Tanzi (1992),
Bird (1989), and Slemrod  (1990) have also stressed  the need for tax policy to pay more attention  to the
practical and administrative  constraints.Tax Reform in Transition  15
Table 3: Alternative Income Tax Systems and Their Revenue Potentials
(a)  A Flat 11 Percent  Income Tax With Exemption for the Poor
Income interval (Lev)  Income share (%)  Tax rate (%)  Average tax
revenue (Lev)
3324  - 10133  20  0  0
10134-16669  40  11  1454
16670 -26864  30  11  2284
26855 +  10  11  4032
Weighted average  8.8  1881
(b)  A Flat 20 Percent Income Tax With Exemption for the Poor
Income interval (Lev)  Income share (%)  Tax rate (%)  Average tax
revenue (Lev)
3324  - 10133  20  0  0
10134-  16669  40  20  2643
16670 -26864  30  20  4152
26855 +  10  20  7331
Weighted average  16  3036
(c) A More Progressive, Three  Bracket Income Tax System
Income interval (Lev)  Income share  (%)  Tax rate  (%)  Average tax
revenue (Lev)
3324  - 10133  20  0  0
10134 -16669  40  20  2643
16670 - 26864  30  30  6228
26855 +  10  40  14661
Weighted average  21  4391
Source: Author's  estimates using 1992 Individual Budget of households Survey, NSI.Fareed M. A.  Hassan, ECSPE  16
revenue of 4,391 Lev per taxpayer, or more than twice the potential revenue of the 1992
system, i.e.,  revenue-enhancing reform.
3.3.  A More R,ealistic Revenue Potential Estimate
The above estimate of revenue potential must be considered an upper bound because it
assumes that taxpayers will fully comply with the proposed tax system, (i.e.,  no tax evasion).
The following revised estimates shown in Table 4 take into account the personal income tax
non-compliance (IPITNC) levels discussed in section 2.  The revised estimates of revenue
potential are lower than the initial findings, reflecting significant tax evasion.  For instance,
revenue potential under the 20 percent flat rate system showed a lower level of 1898 Lev per
taxpayer, compared to 3036 Lev under the initial estimate (see Panel a of Table 4 and panel b
of Table 3).  Nevertheless both of the estimates surpass the revenue productivity of the 1992
personal income tax schedule.
Since the non-compliance level rises with higher tax rates, the proposed three-bracket
progressive tax system indicates a significantly lower revenue potential of 2005 Lev per
taxpayer,  compared to 4391 Lev per taxpayer under the initial findings (see Panel c of Table 3
and panel b of T'able  4).  Again the proposed three-bracket progressive schedule has potentially
higher revenue than the 1850 Lev per taxpayer under the 1992 income tax system.  Finally,
the first positive tax rate under the 1992 tax system is 20 percent.  Thus there is no data to
assess the level of non-compliance associated with tax rates lower than 20 percent.  As such I
was unable to revise the revenue potential estinmate  under the proposed 11 percent flat rate
system.  However, for a linear system with a rate that is approximately half the lowest 1992
statutory rate, I believe that the magnitude of tax evasion effect is likely to be small.
It should be noted that in all of the counterfactual experiments the income threshold at
which positive ta[x  payment must be made is increased from 9,000 Lev (a level at which only
13 percent of the popula.ion are exempted) to 13,215 Lev (a level at which 20 percent of the
population are exempted), thus favoring a much broader spectrum of the poor households (i.e.,Tax Reform in Transition  17
pro-poor reform).  Also, the significant reduction in the number of tax brackets may well
facilitate administration.  Finally, the low alternative tax rates are more amenable to
compliance and enforcement.  But the 1993 amendment to the 1992 income tax law indicates a
Table 4:  Alternative  Tax Systems  and Their Revised  Revenue  Potential  Taking Into
Account  Tax Non-Compliance  Index (PITNC,)
(a)  A Flat 20 Percent  Income Tax With PITNC  of 160 Percent
Income  interval (Lev)  Income  share (%)  Tax rate (%)  Average  tax
revenue  (Lev)
3324  - 10133  20  0  0
10134 - 16669  40  20  1652
16670 - 26864  30  20  2595
26855 +  10  20  4582
Weighted  average  16  1898
(b)  A Progressive  Three-Bracket  Income  Tax System With PITNC  Ranging  from  160 Percent  to 304 Percent
Income  interval (Lev)  Income  share (%)  Tax rate (%)  Average  tax
revenue  (Lev)
3324  - 10133  20  0  0
10134 - 16669  40  20  1652
16670  -26864  30  30  2511
26855 +  10  40  5910
Weighted  average  21  2005
Source:  Author's estimates  using 1992 Individual  Budget of households  Survey,  NSI.Fareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  18
return to high tax rates and more complex  schedule  8.  Under the 1993 Personal  Income Tax
Law there were ten income  tax brackets, an increase  of three brackets with higher rates: 44,
48, and 52 percent.  Such amendment  would complicate  -rather than simplify-  and strain
existing scarce administrative  tax capabilities 9. Under such circumstances,  the revenue,
redistributive,  and developmental  objectives  of tax amendment  may prove difficult to attain.
Fortunately, the 1997 amendment  of the tax law has moved  the personal income tax system
toward less nominal  progressivity  in its rate schedule. For instance, the top-bracket  rate has
been reduced  from 52 percent to its 1992 level of 40 percent. Second, the number of tax
brackets has been halved in comparison with its number in 1993.  Finally, the threshold at
which positive  personal income tax payment  must be made is increased  by 20 percent,
reducing  the tax burdens on the poor.
One of the reasons  why the proposecl  tax systems  surpassed  the 1992 system in its
revenue raisinlg  and re-distributional  effects  lies in the fact that the underlying  income
distribution  is not adequately  taken into consideration  in designing  the 1992  tax rates and
brackets.  Table 5a shows  the tax bracket income level relative to mean per capita income as
obtained  from the 1992  household  budget  suLrvey.  This ratio shows several  interesting
characteristics  of the 1992  tax brackets. The zero bracket (exemption  level) is very narrow,
extending  from zero to less than half the mean per capita income. Positive income  payments
start at higher income  level.  However, it is only at incomes  above 7 times mean per capita
income that the marginal  tax rate becomes  substantial  -- at 36 percent rate.  The narrowness
of higher tax brackets is evident. The top tax rate of 40 percent requires  an income of 14.3
8/Bulgaria's 1993 personal  income  tax schedule  is given in Tax Notes International,  Volume  6, No.
19, 1993, page 1139.
9/The  inherent  administrative  weaknesses  necessitate  simple  tax system  with few  brackets  and rates.
Tanzi (1991)  pointed to the adverse  effect of the transition to a market economy  on the efficiency  of
tax administration  -- from centralized  tax collection  or, in some cases, confiscation  under the planned
regime to the new decentralized  market environment  -- which requires  the introduction  and
development  of an entirely  new tax administration  machinery,  a process which inevitably  takes time.
This was perhaps especially  the case for taxing  IBulgarian  self-employed  and non-wage  income in a
rapidly growing small-scale  service  sector which is difficult  to bring into the tax net.Tax Reforn in Transition  19
times average income.  The second highest rate of 36 percent is reached by taxpayers earning
as much as 7.1 times the average and the income level at which the rate of 32 percent applies
is 4.3 times average income.  The 1992 household budget survey shows that of the 2202
households surveyed, only one household has a per capita income that is greater than seven
times average income, and no one reported income greater than 14 times the average.  In sum,
the 1992 tax brackets are extremely narrow and do not adequately tap the revenue potential of
their respective income groups.  Furthermore,  these ratios are high compared to other Eastern
European Countries.  For instance, the income level where the maximum marginal rate is
applied in Romania started with 3.44 times per capita GDP in 1992 (Shome, Haindl and
Schenone (1993).  This partially explains the relatively low potential revenue and effective tax
rates under the 1992 tax system.  In contrast, setting tax rates as low as possible, reducing the
number of brackets and defining them as broadly, yet realistically as possible, and raising the
exemption level, taking into account the underlying income level and distribution, would
increase revenuesl°.  For instance, all of the proposed tax systems extend the exemption level
to cover the lowest 20 percent.  Thus positive income tax payments start at a relatively higher
income level,  60 percent of average per capita income, compared to 50 percent under the 1992
system.  However, proposed tax rate becomes substantial (i.e.,  30 percent) at incomes around
mean per capita income.  The proposed top rate of 40 percent requires an income nearly twice
the average level (see panel b of Table  5).
A main factor responsible for the erosion of effective tax rates has no doubt been the
weakness of tax administration, especially in a rapidly growing small-scale and self-employed
private sector which is difficult to bring into the tax net.  However, adjusting or modifying the
income tax law so as to facilitate compliance and enforcement may well be the most
expeditious way of improving tax administration.
10/A similar analysis  of the revenue  performance  and distributional  impact  of the 1997 tax changes
requires an examination  of a more recent household  survey  data. Future research employing  such data
is highly encouraged.Fareed M. A.  Hassan, ECSPE  20
Table 5:  Tax Rate/ Base and Tax Bracket  Relative  to Average  Income
(a)  The 1992 Personal  Income  Tax System
Tax rate (%)  Tax base (No. of  As percent of  Ratio of tax
households)  total households  bracket to
average income
0  277  13
20  433  20  0.5
24  1416  64  0.7
28  73  3  2.1
32  2  0  4.3
36  1  0  7.1
40  0  0  14.3
Total  2202  100
(b) The Proposed  Personal  Income  Tax System
Tax rate  Tax rate  Tax rate  Tax base (No.  As percent of  Ratio of tax
11 % flat  20 %  3-bracket  of households  total households  bracket to
flait  progressive  average
income
0  0  0  440  20
11  20  20  881  40  0.60
1  1  20  30  661  30  0.99
11  20  40  220  10  1.60
Total  2202  100
Source:  Author's estimates  using 1992 Individual  Budget  of households  Survey, NSI.Tax Reform in Transition  21
4. Conclusions
The analysis of the 1992 household budget survey indicates that Bulgaria can benefit
from a much simpler and lower income tax structure than the one which prevailed in 1992.
Two possible types of alternative income tax systems have been explored, a flat rate and a
progressive,  but simpler three-bracket rate system, and their implications for potential revenue
and income distribution.  The analysis suggests that each of these alternative systems would
have been more efficient in terms of potential revenues, while increasing the protection to the
poor through increasing the exemption level, i.e.,  revenue-enhancing and redistributive tax
reform.  The results are robust to the inclusion of the existing significant tax evasion.
The actual developments since 1992 have, first, moved Bulgaria even further away
from the proposed simple income tax systems.  In particular, the 1993 amendments to the 1992
personal income tax have complicated the system in two major ways.  First,  while the 1992
marginal income tax rates were not low by international standards, the rates implemented in
the 1993 amendment were even higher, with top rate rising from 40 to 52 percent.  Second,
the number of tax brackets were increased from 7 to 10, with three additional brackets having
higher rates of 44, 48, and 52 percent.  These more complex and higher rates are almost
certain to complicate administration and enforcement, and provide powerful additional
incentives for tax evasion.  Fortunately, the country began to move toward less nominal
progressivity in its personal income tax structure, following the 1997 tax reform program.
But whichever alternative income tax structure is chosen, it should be clear from the
above analysis that the 1992 system and, even more so, the 1993 amended income tax system
has inferior characteristics to simpler and more efficient alternatives.  Therefore,  further
efforts in improving the income tax system in Bulgaria must aim to raise the exemption level,
set the rates as low as possible, and reduce the number of brackets and define them as broadly,
yet realistically,  as possible.  Reform in this direction would not only improve the revenue
performance of this important tax, but also improve its protection of the poor.  The
government has made significant progress in adopting several of these measures in its 1997 taxFareed  M. A. Hassan, ECSPE  22
reform program.  The country  began to move toward less nominal  progressivity  in its rate
structure, following  the 1997  amendment  to its Personal  Income Tax Law.  For  example, the
top-bracket  rate has been reduced from 52 percent to its 1992  level of 40 percent.  Second, the
number of tax brackets has been halved in comparison  with its number in 1993. Third, the
exemption  level has been increased  by 20 percent.  Such changes  would  certainly reduce tax
burdens on the poor.  Furthermore,  broader and simpler tax bases would reduce opportunities
for tax evasion, facilitate  administration,  and enhance  revenue.
Given that Bulgaria's distribution  of income is similar to that of other emerging  market
economies, and to the extent that personal income tax system in these economies  suffer from
similar deficiencies  as Bulgaria's system, the reform suggestions  made in this paper are
potentially  relevant  to other emerging  market economies  contemplating  tax reforms.Tax Reform in Transition  23
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